Don’t you hate it when your mobile network gets interrupted resulting in unsent messages, dropped calls and inaccessibility to the internet? By adding mobility to the architecture of the telecommunications network service providers. the delivery of telecommunications connection is enhanced.
The third generation partnership project, or 3GPP, or drone-based flying base station known as UxNB offers more flexible, dynamic and adaptive connectivity coverage, in contrast to the standard stationary terrestrial base station’s fixed cell.
By getting closer to the mobile device or securing its line-of-sight, the flying base station can also enhance the channel quality to the user (which is crucial for mmWave communications as they are less effective at crossing physical obstacles than lower-band communications). The next-generation wireless applications, such as sensor applications (for example, monitoring, personal, body, and environmental monitoring), and those based on holographic and tactile operations (for example, virtual reality/VR or augmented reality/AR), are made possible by the improved connection coverage and communication channels.
Flying Base Station Integration
UAV flying base stations are a feature of sixth-generation networking that enhance base station coverage and channel link properties for mobile users. The introduction of the flying base station into mobile networking should allow backward compatibility with the 5G networks, as is customary with emerging technologies in mobile networking. For instance, a mobile user who only supports 5G or even older-generation telecoms, such as 2G for emergency applications, can nevertheless get connectivity services from a flying base station.
Properties of UAV Flying Base Stations
A UAV flying base station integrates the capabilities of a UAV drone (to shift its position) with a base station (to deliver a last-mile hop wireless communication connection to the user equipment). A UAV flying base station, on the other hand, may be distinguished from each of these fundamental technologies and brings unique security flaws and dangers that weren’t present in conventional UAV drones or stationary base stations before.
Upcoming Project Discussions
While the earlier study can theoretically provide the groundwork for protecting flying base stations, more research is necessary to develop security solutions that take into account the particular difficulties and traits of upcoming flying base stations. Additionally, a systems perspective is necessary, along with knowledge of how various components and needs influence every security solution. To restrict the usefulness and viability of the flying base station system, an effective security solution can, for instance, impose overheads that are prohibitive (by delaying the RRC, creating extra DoS vulnerabilities, or necessitating regular battery recharge). Furthermore, due to the novel security implications brought about by the flying base station activities, the security concerns might be prioritised differently, for instance, because mobile users of telecommunications rely on the base station, the impact of a flying base station is severe and important.
Opportunities for a Flying Base Station for Security
Flying base stations can provide special chances to improve base station operating security. These opportunities include enhancing channel reliability and jamming resistance by utilising the mobility of the flying base station, utilising line-of-sight path securing to provide additional security properties (which can be important for mmWave communications as it gets blocked on the physical barriers), enhancing reliability by jointly processing the communications with line-of-sight sensing, and developing distinctive physical-layer signatures based on the mobility of a flying base station.
In conclusion, in order to ensure the accessibility and reliability of UAV flying base station operations, this paper aims to inspire and inform additional research and development. As a result, the researchers describe and build upon the flying base station’s component technologies, which include embedded and battery control, authentication, distributed networking, and customary telecommunications networking (including the stationary ground base station). In order to address the particular qualities and the accompanying gaps for protecting the flying base station, they evaluated the relevant literature in safeguarding the component technologies. This paper’s conclusion emphasises significant unresolved issues to secure UAV flying base stations and discusses future work to support future research.
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